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INTRODUCTION 
hen Congress passed the Uruguay Round Agreements Act 
(“URAA”) in 1994,2 it allowed foreign companies, for the 
first time,3 to copyright work from the public domain.4  In doing so, 
Congress undeniably restrained the air that Justice Brandeis 
proclaimed free when he declared, “The general rule of law is, that the 
noblest of human productions—knowledge, truths ascertained, 
conceptions, and ideas—become, after voluntary communication to 
others, free as the air to common use.”5  By passing the URAA, just 
over 200 years after the United States declared independence from 
 
Copyright © 2008 by Michael P. Goodman, Ph.D. 
 * J.D. 2008, Duke University School of Law; Ph.D. 2001, Emory University; B.S. 1997, 
University of Mary Washington. 
 1. Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 59 (1884). 
 2. Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, sec. 514, § 104A, 108 Stat. 4809, 
4976–81 (1994) (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 104A). 
 3. Paul J. Heald & Suzanna Sherry, Implied Limits on the Legislative Power: The 
Intellectual Property Clause as an Absolute Constraint on Congress, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 1119, 
1179 (2000). 
 4. First Amended Complaint at 3, Golan v. Gonzales, 310 F. Supp. 2d 1215 (D. Colo. 
2004) (No. 01-B-1854) (“Section 514 of the URAA mandates a ‘wholesale removal of vast 
amounts of existing works—thousands of books, paintings, drawings, music, films, photographs, 
and other artistic works—from the public domain.’”).  The URAA and its advocates describe 
this as “restoring” copyright.  Uruguay Round Agreements Act, sec. 514, § 104A, 108 Stat. at 
4976–81. See also S. REP. NO. 103-412, at 10 (1994) (“The copyright subtitle . . . restores 
copyright protection to works already in the public domain in the United States but still under 
protection in a WTO Member that is the source of the work.”).  However, as every affected 
work has a U.S. copyright for the first time through passage of the URAA, this appears to be a 
mere semantic avoidance of the more accurate description that the URAA “secures” copyright 
in these works.  See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 5. Int’l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 250 (1918) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
W
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England, Congress has taken an unprecedented step toward bringing 
U.S. copyright law back into line with the laws of England, mainland 
Europe, and the rest of the international community.6  Congress 
passed the Act in order to meet international trade obligations7 with 
its supporters proclaiming, “The Uruguay round is the most 
comprehensive trade agreement in history” and an “unprecedented 
opportunity to benefit the United States, create new high-paying jobs, 
and strengthen our economy.”8 
The general problem with trying to force international law onto 
our constitutional system is particularly apparent in the copyright 
context, because this is an area in which the disparity between the 
prevailing view of the world community and the American view is 
especially large.9  For example, whereas the American perspective is 
that copyright is a means of providing an inducement for authors to 
create new works in order to achieve a greater purpose,10 the majority 
of the world views copyright as an end in its own right, based on 
granting authors “moral rights” to exert control over their work.11 
In The End of Copyright, David Nimmer describes the passage of 
the URAA as representing “the first tremors of certain tectonic shifts 
in United States sovereignty” that call into question “the identity of 
the master in the copyright sphere.”12  Professor Nimmer suggests 
that, in passing the URAA, Congress created a dramatic clash 
 
 6. See infra Part I.  For a general discussion of the increasing trend toward 
internationalization of copyright, see Richard B. Graves III, Globalization, Treaty Powers, and 
the Limits of the Intellectual Property Clause, 50 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 199 (2003). 
 7. The URAA is entitled, “An Act to approve and implement the trade agreements 
concluded in the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations.”  Uruguay Round 
Agreements Act, sec. 514, § 104A, 108 Stat. at 4976–81. See also Doris E. Long, Copyright and 
the Uruguay Round Agreements: A New Era of Protection or an Illusory Promise?, 22 AIPLA 
Q.J. 531, 565 (1995). 
 8. 140 CONG. REC. S15271-03, at S15278 (Dec. 1, 1994) (statement of Sen. Cochran). 
 9. See Long, supra note 7, at 533 (referring to some of the disagreements regarding 
copyright policy as entailing “diametrically opposed views”). 
 10. E.g., Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc., v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 580 (1985) 
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 60-2222, at 7 (1909) (“The enactment of 
copyright legislation by Congress under the terms of the Constitution is not based upon any 
natural right that the author has in his writings . . . but upon the ground that the welfare of the 
public will be served and progress of science and useful arts will be promoted by securing to 
authors for limited periods the exclusive rights to their writings.”). 
 11. Doris Long notes that, during debate on the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 
“[a]mong the developed countries that submitted drafts, the United States was the only one 
which sought to exclude moral rights.” Long, supra note 7, at 552. 
 12. David Nimmer, The End of Copyright, 48 VAND. L. REV. 1385, 1385–86 (1995). 
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between international trade law and the United States Constitution,13 
a fray into which courts have only begun to tread.14  To meet our 
international obligations, Congress ignored the Constitution, 
specifically the Patent and Copyright Clause.15  Professor Nimmer 
fears that trade law will win this clash, as “all legal doctrines are 
collapsing into the gigantic crunch of trade law.”16 
In this Essay, I describe how the Patent and Copyright Clause17 
insists that Congress cannot so readily trade America’s “air.”  In Part I 
of this Essay, I briefly discuss section 514 of the URAA, in which 
Congress granted foreign authors copyright to works in the public 
domain, and I review two recent challenges to this section under the 
Patent and Copyright Clause.  In Part II, I analyze why the URAA 
must be subject to the limitations of the Patent and Copyright Clause.  
In Part III, I describe two reasons why this Clause dictates that 
section 514 is unconstitutional.  First, I briefly explore how section 514 
unconstitutionally grants copyrights to entities other than “authors.”18  
Then, I explain why the rule from Graham v. John Deere Co.,19 which 
states that patents may not be secured for works in the public domain, 
applies with equal force to copyright.20 
I.  SECTION 514 OF THE URAA AND  
CHALLENGES TO ITS CONSTITUTIONALITY 
Congress enacted the URAA in order to comply with the United 
States’ obligations as a member of the World Trade Organization.21  
 
 13. Id. at 1386. 
 14. See infra Part I. 
 15. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 16. Nimmer, supra note 12, at 1387. 
 17. Commentators usually describe Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 in its entirety as “the 
Intellectual Property Clause,” see, e.g., Ray Patterson, Understanding the Copyright Clause, 47 
J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 365, 367 (2000), although “the Patent and Copyright Clause” or the 
“Progress Clause” are also common, see, e.g., Dotan Oliar, Making Sense of the Intellectual 
Property Clause: Promotion of Progress as a Limitation on Congress’s Intellectual Property 
Power, 94 GEO. L.J. 1771, 1772–73 n.1 (2006).  The words of the Clause relevant to patents are 
often described as “the Patent Clause” and those relevant to copyright as “the Copyright 
Clause.”  Id.  For the sake of convenience, I will refer throughout this essay to the Clause as 
“the Patent and Copyright Clause.” 
 18. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. See infra Part III.A. 
 19. 383 U.S. 1, 6 (1966). 
 20. See infra Part III.B.2. 
 21. See, e.g., David E. Shipley, What Do Flexible Road Signs, Children’s Clothes and the 
Allied Campaign in Europe During WWII Have in Common? The Public Domain and the 
Supreme Court’s Intellectual Property Jurisprudence, 13 U. BALT. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 57, 98–99 
(2005). 
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The United States became a member of the Berne Convention for the 
Protection of Literary and Artistic Works22 in 1988.23  Article 18 of the 
Convention “requires that the terms of the Convention apply to all 
works that have fallen into the public domain for reasons other than 
expiration of their term of copyright.”24  The Berne Convention is not 
self-executing, however, and the United States never passed 
legislation implementing Article 18.25  During 1993 and 1994, 
following over seven years of world trade talks, 111 countries drafted 
and signed the Uruguay Round of the Multilateral Trade Negotiations 
on the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (“GATT”).26  The 
United States is a signatory member of GATT, including the 
associated Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights (“TRIPS”).27  Congress passed the URAA in 1994 to 
implement these agreements into U.S. law.28 
Section 514 of the URAA automatically grants copyright 
protection to foreign copyright holders whose works are protected in 
their own country, but which are in the public domain in the United 
States, for three separate reasons.29  First, the URAA grants copyright 
to works if the foreign copyright owner failed to comply with U.S. 
copyright formalities.30  Second, a copyright is granted if the subject 
matter was not previously, but now is, copyrightable in the United 
States, such as sound recordings recorded before 1972.31  Finally, a 
foreign work is granted a U.S. copyright if the United States had 
previously failed to recognize copyrights from the owner’s home 
country.32 
 
 21. See Long, supra note 7, at 572–73. 
 22. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, July 24, 1974, 828 
U.N.T.S. 221, 275, 277. 
 23. Edward C. Walterscheid, Understanding the Copyright Act of 1790: The Issue of 
Common Law Copyright in America and the Modern Interpretation of the Copyright Power, 53 
J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 313, 353 n.46 (2006). 
 24. Long, supra note 7, at 571. 
 25. S. REP. NO. 103-412, at 225 (1994); Carter v. Helmsley-Spear, Inc., 71 F.3d 77, 83 (2d 
Cir. 1995). See also Quality King Distribs., Inc. v. L’anza Research Int’l, Inc., 523 U.S. 135, 153 
(1998) (“Equally irrelevant is the fact that the Executive Branch of the Government has entered 
into at least five international trade agreements . . . none has been ratified by the Senate.”). 
 26. Long, supra note 7, at 533. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Shipley, supra note 21, at 98–99. 
 29. Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, sec. 514, § 104A(h)(6), 108 Stat. 
4809, 4980–81 (1994); S. REP. NO. 103-412, at 225–26 (1994). 
 30. Uruguay Round Agreements Act, sec. 514, § 104A(h)(6), 108 Stat. at 4980–81. 
 31. See Long, supra note 7, at 572–73. 
 32. Uruguay Round Agreements Act, sec. 514, § 104A(h)(6), 108 Stat. at 4980–81. 
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Since the URAA was first passed, critics have raised serious 
questions about the constitutionality of section 514.33  Two cases 
challenging this section as unconstitutional under the Patent and 
Copyright Clause have thus far reached the federal circuit courts of 
appeals, Luck’s Music Library, Inc. v. Ashcroft34 and Golan v. 
Gonzales.35 
In Luck’s Music Library, a “family-owned, corporation that 
repackage[d] and [sold] works already in the public domain,” joined 
Moviecraft, a business that preserved films that were already in the 
public domain, to argue that the Patent and Copyright Clause of the 
Constitution “requires the public to have free access to copy and use 
works once they have fallen into the public domain.”36  In Golan v. 
Gonzales, another group of “artists or purveyors of art material” also 
challenged the constitutionality of section 514.  They proposed that 
once a work goes into the public domain the Patent and Copyright 
Clause prohibits Congress from removing it from free use.37 
In both cases, the district courts that first considered these issues 
rejected the notion that Congress lacks authority to pass section 514 
 
 33. This Essay only explores the constitutionality of section 514 under the Patent and 
Copyright Clause, but section 514 has also been challenged as violating the First Amendment in 
the same cases discussed within this section.  E.g., Golan v. Ashcroft, 310 F. Supp. 2d 1215, 1220 
(D. Colo. 2004), aff’d in part, remanded in part sub nom. Golan v. Gonzales, 501 F.3d 1179 (10th  
Cir. 2007).  With respect to whether it violates the Takings Clause, Due Process, and Equal 
Protection, see generally Thomas Gordon Kennedy, GATT-out of the Public Domain: 
Constitutional Dimensions of Foreign Copyright Restoration, 11 ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL 
COMMENT. 545 (1996).  Section 514 is not the only part of the URAA to face constitutional 
challenges.  In addition, sections 512 (17 U.S.C. § 1101) and 513 (18 U.S.C. § 2319A), anti-
bootlegging statutes that establish civil and criminal penalties, respectively, for recording and 
trafficking copies of live musical performances, have been challenged as unconstitutional under 
both the Patent and Copyright Clause and the First Amendment.  United States v. Moghadam, 
175 F.3d 1269 (11th Cir. 1999) (Patent and Copyright Clause); United States v. Martignon, 346 
F. Supp. 2d 413 (S.D.N.Y. 2004), vacated, 492 F.3d 140 (2d Cir. 2007) (Patent and Copyright 
Clause and the First Amendment). See also Joseph C. Merschman, Anchoring Copyright Laws 
in the Copyright Clause: Halting the Commerce Clause End Run Around Limits on Congress’s 
Copyright Power, 34 CONN. L. REV. 661 (2002). 
 34. 407 F.3d 1262 (D.C. Cir. 2005). 
 35. 501 F.3d 1179. 
 36. Luck’s Music Library v. Ashcroft, 321 F. Supp. 2d 107, 110, 112 (D.D.C. 2004), aff’d, 
407 F.3d 1262 (D.C. Cir. 2005). See also Amanda Roach, Case Summary, Luck’s Music Library 
v. Ashcroft 321 F. Supp. 2d 107 (2004), 15 DEPAUL-LCA J. ART & ENT. L. & POL’Y 421 (2005). 
 37. Plaintiffs combined this challenge with an argument that the Copyright Term Extension 
Act was unconstitutional, which the District Court held was foreclosed by the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Eldred v. Gonzales, 537 U.S. 186 (2003), Golan v. Ashcroft, 310 F. Supp. 2d at 1216–
18. 
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under the Patent and Copyright Clause.38  When considering Luck’s 
challenge, the District Court for the District of Columbia relied on the 
Supreme Court’s direction that “[t]o comprehend the scope of 
Congress’ power under the IP clause, ‘a page of history is worth a 
volume of logic.’”39 The Court reviewed the history of copyright law40 
and concluded that “Congress’ past actions show a clear history of 
allowing retroactive copyrights, lending significant weight” to the 
argument that section 514 is constitutional.41  In Golan, the District 
Court for Colorado also considered Congress’ historical treatment of 
copyright.42  Finding that “[o]n the whole, Congress has historically 
demonstrated little compunction about removing copyrightable 
materials from the public domain,” the court held that Congress acted 
within its authority under the Patent and Copyright Clause.43 
In their respective reviews of the historical treatment of copyright, 
both district courts relied on an understanding that the very first 
Copyright Act, passed in 1790, demonstrates that “[t]he First Congress 
evidently determined that [removing works from the public domain] 
was constitutionally permissible.”44  In an essay critical of the 
reasoning in both of these cases, Edward Waltersheid notes that these 
two courts maintained a flawed understanding of copyright’s history 
in reliance on the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Copyright 
Act of 1790 in Wheaton v. Peters.45  Disapproving of the courts’ 
reliance on a judicial opinion concerning that statute rather than on 
the original copyright statute itself, Waltersheid opines, “Reliance on 
judicial legerdemain in interpreting the 1790 Copyright Act is a frail 
reed on which to predicate the copyright power of Congress.”46  After 
reviewing the historical treatment of copyright, he concludes that “a 
basic premise used by courts in the past several years to justify the 
constitutionality of . . . Section 514 of the URAA is suspect at best.”47  
 
 38. Luck’s Music Library, 321 F. Supp. 2d at 112; Golan v. Gonzales, No. Civ.01-B-
1854(BNB), 2005 WL 914754, at *14 (D. Colo. Apr. 20, 2005), aff’d in part, remanded in part, 
501 F.3d 1179 (10th  Cir. 2007). 
 39. Luck’s Music Library, 321 F. Supp. 2d at 113 (quoting Eldred, 537 U.S. at 200) (internal 
brackets omitted). 
 40. Id. at 113–16. 
 41. Id. at 116. 
 42. Golan v. Gonzales, 2005 WL 914754, at *5–14. 
 43. Id. at *14. 
 44. Id. at *11. See also Luck’s Music Library, 321 F. Supp. 2d at 113. 
 45. Walterscheid, supra note 23, at 353 (citing Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591 
(1834)). 
 46. Id. at 353 (footnote omitted). 
 47. Id. 
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I will not attempt to resolve whether this historical understanding is 
flawed, except to recall the fact that “no one acquires a vested or 
protected right in violation of the Constitution by long use, even when 
that span of time covers our entire national existence.”48  Thus, 
regardless of whether Congress historically believed that it could 
remove work from the public domain, this issue is not determinative 
of the larger question: whether such an action is prohibited by the 
Constitution. 
With respect to congressional authority to pass section 514, the 
district court in Golan reasoned, “[T]hat the public domain is indeed 
public does not mandate that the threshold across which works pass 
into it cannot be traversed in both directions.”49  The district court in 
Golan was also particularly forthright in its opinion regarding the 
applicability of patent doctrine to copyright.  According to that court’s 
view, 
Removal of existent knowledge from the public domain is a 
persistent danger in the expansion of patent monopolies and, for 
that reason, informs courts’ understanding of Congress’ patent 
power to a considerable degree.  That danger, however, is not 
lurking within the retroactive expansion of copyrights . . . . It is 
unlikely that the public has a greater interest in copyrightable 
works than it does in patentable ones.50 
The district court in Luck’s Music Library agreed that a constitutional 
prohibition on Congress with respect to patents is “inapplicable” to 
copyright.51  In Golan, the district court built upon this basic attempt 
to distinguish copyrights from patents to further assert, “[E]xpansion 
of the copyright does not impede the progress of science and the 
useful arts to the extent that expansion of the patent might.”52 
When the plaintiffs in Luck’s Music Library appealed their case to 
the D.C. Circuit, they fared no better than they had at the district 
level.53  After hearing the appeal, the D.C. Circuit affirmed the district 
court’s view that the Patent and Copyright Clause does not prohibit 
 
 48. Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 678 (1970). 
 49. Golan v. Gonzales, No. Civ.01-B-1854(BNB), 2005 WL 914754, at *3 (D. Colo. Apr. 20, 
2005), aff’d in part, remanded in part, 501 F.3d 1179 (10th  Cir. 2007). 
 50. Id. at *5 (citation omitted). 
 51. Luck’s Music Library, Inc. v. Ashcroft, 321 F. Supp. 2d 107, 116–17 (D.D.C. 2004) aff’d 
sub nom. Luck’s Music Library, Inc. v. Gonzales, 407 F.3d 1262 (D.C. Cir. 2005).  This 
prohibition is discussed infra Part III.B.1. 
 52. Golan v. Gonzales, 2005 WL 914754, at *12. 
 53. Luck’s Music Library, 407 F.3d at 1262. 
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Congress from removing works from the public domain.54  Relying on 
an understanding of Eldred v. Ashcroft55 as holding that Congress 
need have only a rational basis in order to pass copyright legislation, 
the D.C. Circuit stressed the trade implications of the URAA, quoting 
a U.S. Senate report that stated that “[section 514] helped secure 
better foreign protection for U.S. intellectual property and was ‘a 
significant opportunity to reduce the impact of copyright piracy on 
our world trade position.’”56  Relying on a substantially similar 
understanding of the history of copyright as that expressed by the 
district courts,57 the D.C. Circuit also disposed of the argument that 
patent law’s prohibition applies to copyright, noting, “[T]he case dealt 
with patents rather than copyright, and ideas applicable to one don’t 
automatically apply to the other.”58  The court further distinguished 
patent from copyright because, unlike inventors of patents, an “author 
is eager to disclose her work.”59 
In support of the government’s position in Golan’s appeal to the 
Tenth Circuit, amici crafted an argument distinct from that relied 
upon by the government or the lower court.60  Amici proposed that 
any discussion of whether the Patent and Copyright Clause would 
authorize Congress to pass section 514 is irrelevant to a consideration 
of whether section 514 is constitutional, as Congress can, in the 
alternative, pass the statute under the Commerce Clause or the Treaty 
Power.61 
Before addressing this paper’s thesis that both district courts and 
the D.C. Circuit erred by refusing to apply patent doctrine to 
copyright, I first respond to amici’s argument.  I describe why 
limitations of the Patent and Copyright Clause must apply to 
congressional acts, regardless of the power under which they are 
invoked. 
 
 54. Id. at 1263. 
 55. 537 U.S. 186 (2003). 
 56. Luck’s Music Library, 407 F.3d at 1264 (quoting S. REP. NO. 100-352, at 2 (1988)). 
 57. Id. at 1265–66. 
 58. Id. at 1266. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Brief for The International Coalition for Copyright Protection as Amici Curiae 
Supporting Respondents, Golan v. Gonzales, 501 F.3d 1179 (10th Cir. 2007). 
 61. Id at 1182–84. 
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II.  CONGRESS MAY NOT SIDESTEP THE PATENT AND  
COPYRIGHT CLAUSE BY INVOKING ANOTHER ARTICLE I POWER 
The Patent and Copyright Clause is “both a grant of power and a 
limitation.”62  While it is clear that, under this Clause, Congress has 
“broad” power,63 and that Congress may “implement the stated 
purpose of the Framers by selecting the policy which in its judgment 
best effectuates the constitutional aim,”64 it is equally apparent that 
this power is not unlimited.  As the Supreme Court has cautioned, 
“The clause thus describes both the objective which Congress may 
seek and the means to achieve it.”65  In Sony Corp. of America v. 
Universal City Studios, Inc., the Court referred with approval to 
Congress’ own declaration of a check upon its copyright power: “In 
enacting a copyright law Congress must consider . . . how much will 
the monopoly granted be detrimental to the public?”66  Some 
commentators have suggested that the patent and copyright “power 
of Congress was enumerated in the Constitution for the purpose of 
expressing its limitations.”67  Still, to say that the Patent and Copyright 
Clause provides an important limitation on the power of Congress 
does not specifically delineate the boundaries of those limits.  
Nonetheless, over the years the Court has made clear that the outer 
limit of Congress’ discretion is bounded in a number of ways, 
including by the meanings of “limited times,”68 “author,”69 and 
“inventor.”70  Commentators have also described additional 
limitations “of constitutional weight” derived from the Patent and 
Copyright Clause as a whole.71 
 
 62. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 5 (1966). 
 63. Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 561–62 (1973) (“[T]he area in which Congress 
may act is broad . . . .”). 
 64. Graham, 383 U.S. at 6. 
 65. Goldstein, 412 U.S. at 555. 
 66. 464 U.S. 417, 429 n.10 (1984) (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 60-2222, at 7 (1909)). 
 67. Heald & Sherry, supra note 3, at 1153 (quoting 1 WILLIAM W. CROSSKEY, POLITICS 
AND THE CONSTITUTION IN THE HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 486 (Univ. of Chicago Press 
1953)). See also Graves III, supra note 6, at 204. 
 68. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 199–200 (2003). 
 69. See infra Part III.A. 
 70. See Alexander Milburn Co. v. Davis-Bournonville Co., 270 U.S. 390, 400 (1926) 
(“[O]ne really must be the first inventor in order to be entitled to a patent.”).  Many 
commentators have also explained that a “fixation” requirement is inherent in the meaning of 
the term “Writings.”  See infra note 90. 
 71. Heald & Sherry, supra note 3, at 1167 (describing four such limitations).  The existence 
of limitations in the Patent and Copyright Clause does not, of course, suggest that all 
congressional acts should be subject to review relating to the limits of the Patent and Copyright 
Clause.  As they explained, the limits of the Clause must be applied only to “legislation that 
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To bypass these limitations, some courts and commentators have 
proposed that any inherent limitations on congressional authority 
found within the Patent and Copyright Clause do not apply to 
statutes passed under another constitutional authority.72  However, 
recent scholarship has begun to point to flaws in the logic behind this 
notion.73  I join these commentators in arguing that the limitations of 
the Patent and Copyright Clause prohibit the removal of work from 
the public domain, as the Court explicitly maintained in Graham v. 
John Deere Co.,74 notwithstanding any other constitutional authority. 
It is well established that “the constitutionality of action taken by 
Congress does not depend on recitals of the power which it 
undertakes to exercise.”75  In addition, the Supreme Court has 
explicitly stated that a grant of power by one constitutional clause 
does not shield congressional action under that clause from the 
requirement that it meet with other express limitations of the 
 
imposes monopoly-like costs on the public through the granting of exclusive rights.”  Id. at 1160 
(emphasis omitted). 
 72. In United States v. Moghadam, the Eleventh Circuit considered the constitutionality of 
section 513 of the URAA, 18 U.S.C. § 2319A. 175 F.3d 1269 (11th Cir. 1999).  While explicitly 
declining to decide whether this section violates the “Limited Times” limitation, id. at 1281, the 
court held that it does not violate a “fixation” requirement, id. at 1282, derived from the term 
“Writings” in the Patent and Copyright Clause, id. at 1280, and suggested that Congress could 
pass the provision under the Commerce Clause despite this limitation, id. at 1277–80.  See also 
Jane C. Ginsburg, No “Sweat”? Copyright and Other Protection of Works of Information after 
Feist v. Rural Telephone, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 338, 369 (1992); Paul Goldstein, Copyright and 
Legislation: The Kastenmeier Years, 55 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 79 (1992); Dennis S. Karjala, 
Copyright and Misappropriation, 17 U. DAYTON L. REV. 885, 897 n.48 (1992) (“Assuming that 
publication places a work in commerce, Congress has this power unless the patent and copyright 
clause implies a limitation on the Commerce Clause . . . . [I]t seems unlikely that an original 
intent reading of the Constitution would require such an interpretation.”).  Congress also 
appears to have subscribed to this view.  See Heald & Sherry, supra note 3, at 1120 (“Despite 
the limiting language of the Intellectual Property Clause, Congress has recently enacted, or is 
seriously contemplating enacting, more than a dozen laws that seem to ignore or purport to 
avoid it.”). See also Peter A. Jaszi, Goodbye to All That—A Reluctant (and Perhaps Premature) 
Adieu to a Constitutionally-Grounded Discourse of Public Interest in Copyright Law, 29 VAND. 
J. TRANSNAT'L L. 595, 596 (1996) (“Sooner or later, and more likely sooner than later, one will 
see legislation introduced in the U.S. Congress to restore protection for domestic works now in 
the public domain . . . .”). 
 73. Merschman, supra note 33, at 683–92; Adam R. Tarosky, The Constitutionality of 
WIPO’s Broadcasting Treaty: The Originality and Limited Times Requirements of the Copyright 
Clause, 2006 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 16 (2006). 
 74. 383 U.S. 1, 6 (1966). 
 75. EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 243 n.18 (1983) (quoting Woods v. Miller, 333 U.S. 
138, 144 (1948)). 
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Constitution.76  The most prominent example of this principle is seen 
in Railway Labor Executives’ Ass’n v. Gibbons.77  In that case, the 
Court struck down a congressional act passed under the Commerce 
Clause because the act violated a limitation of the Bankruptcy Clause 
that laws be “uniform” throughout the states.78  As the Court 
explained, “[I]f we were to hold that Congress had the power to enact 
nonuniform bankruptcy laws pursuant to the Commerce Clause, we 
would eradicate from the Constitution a limitation on the power of 
Congress to enact bankruptcy laws.”79  As recently as 1999, the Court 
reiterated this principle: 
Article I of the Constitution grants Congress broad power to 
legislate in certain areas.  Those legislative powers are, however, 
limited not only by the scope of the Framers’ affirmative 
delegation, but also by the principle that they may not be exercised 
in a way that violates other specific provisions of the 
Constitution.80 
Despite the implication of these lessons to copyright, various 
courts and commentators have contended that the Commerce Clause 
may be used to bypass the Patent and Copyright Clause,81 largely in 
reliance on a misreading of the Trade-Mark Cases.82  Though the 
Supreme Court’s explicit holding in that case was only that Congress 
could not implement federal trademark legislation under authority of 
the Patent and Copyright Clause,83 the case has also been read as 
granting Congress tacit approval to pass such legislation under the 
Commerce Clause.  Such a reading is found in United States v. 
Moghadam, in which the Eleventh Circuit noted, “[T]he Trade-Mark 
Cases stands for the proposition that legislation which would not be 
permitted under the Copyright Clause could nonetheless be 
permitted under the Commerce Clause, provided that the 
 
 76. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 132 (1976) (“Congress has plenary authority in all areas in 
which it has substantive legislative jurisdiction, so long as the exercise of that authority does not 
offend some other constitutional restriction.”) (internal citation omitted). 
 77. 455 U.S. 457 (1982). 
 78. Id. at 473. 
 79. Id. at 468–69. 
 80. Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 508 (1999) (internal quotation omitted). 
 81. See supra note 72.  See generally Nimmer, supra note 12 (pointing out that expanded 
use by Congress of the Commerce Clause, in particular, has gone beyond the limitations of the 
Copyright Clause). 
 82. 100 U.S. 82 (1879). 
 83. Id. at 94. 
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independent requirements of the latter are met.”84  However, to say 
that Congress may look to their other enumerated powers to enact 
legislation not permitted by one Clause is not to say that Congress 
may do the same when an act is prohibited by another Clause. 
This distinction became expressly clear when the Court again had 
the opportunity to consider federal trademark legislation in Dastar 
Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp.85  In Dastar, the Court 
considered an aspect of the federal trademark statute, the Lanham 
Act, which, under one reading, would impermissibly violate the Patent 
and Copyright Clause.86  In construing the Lanham Act so that it 
would not conflict with the Patent and Copyright Clause, the Court 
noted that “[t]o hold otherwise would be akin to finding that § 43(a) 
[of the Lanham Act] created a species of perpetual patent and 
copyright, which Congress may not do.”87  Thus, the Court made clear 
that even with respect to trademark legislation expressly passed 
under the Commerce Clause, Congress cannot violate the limitations 
of the Patent and Copyright Clause. 
In Moghadam, the Eleventh Circuit implicitly recognized this 
distinction when it documented a line of cases in which the Supreme 
Court prohibited the Commerce Clause from being used to 
circumvent limitations of other clauses.88  Describing Railway Labor 
Executives Ass’n v. Gibbons as representing “the Framers’ judgment 
that Congress should be affirmatively prohibited from passing certain 
types of legislation, no matter under which provision,”89 the 
Moghadam court ruled that Congress could bypass the Patent and 
Copyright Clause because “the Copyright Clause does not envision 
that Congress is positively forbidden from extending copyright-like 
protection under other constitutional clauses, such as the Commerce 
Clause, to works of authorship that may not meet the fixation 
requirement inherent in the term ‘Writings.’”90  With respect to a 
limitation of the Patent and Copyright Clause, however, the court 
 
 84. 175 F.3d 1269, 1278 (11th Cir. 1999). 
 85. 539 U.S. 23 (2003). 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. at 37. 
 88. United States v. Moghadam, 175 F.3d 1269, 1279–81 (11th Cir. 1999). 
 89. Id. at 1279. 
 90. Id. at 1280.  Some commentators disagree with the Moghadam court’s view that 
fixation is not a requirement of the Patent and Copyright Clause.  E.g., Merschman, supra note 
33, at 678–83. See also Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 561 (1973) (“‘[W]ritings’ . . . may be 
interpreted to include any physical rendering of the fruits of creative intellectual or aesthetic 
labor.”) (emphasis added).  I do not here attempt to fully explore or resolve this debate. 
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stated, “[w]e assume arguendo, without deciding, that the Commerce 
Clause could not be used to avoid a limitation in the Copyright 
Clause if the particular use of the Commerce Clause . . . were 
fundamentally inconsistent with the particular limitation in the 
Copyright Clause . . . .”91  Thus, even under the Eleventh Circuit’s 
reading, when the Patent and Copyright Clause “positively forbids” 
legislation, Congress may not bypass this limitation under the 
Commerce Clause.92  The Eleventh Circuit also clearly recognized that 
other limitations from the Patent and Copyright Clause do reach this 
same level of an absolute prohibition on Congress.93 
Commentators have similarly suggested that the treaty power 
independently grants Congress special authority, which may be used 
to bypass any limitations of the Patent and Copyright Clause.94  These 
arguments rely on the Supreme Court’s dicta in the Trade-Mark 
Cases, stating that “we wish to be understood as leaving untouched 
the whole question of the treaty-making power over trade-marks, and 
of the duty of Congress to pass any laws necessary to carry treaties 
into effect.”95  The arguments also rely on Missouri v. Holland, which 
stands for the proposition that Congress has broad authority under its 
treaty power beyond the enumerated powers of Article I, Section 8.96  
However, Holland also recognized that “a treaty cannot be valid if it 
infringes the Constitution, that there are limits, therefore, to the 
treaty-making power . . . ,” and the court only found the treaty at issue 
to be within Congress’ powers after finding that “[t]he treaty in 
question does not contravene any prohibitory words to be found in 
the Constitution.”97  Moreover, the URAA is not a treaty, of course, 
 
 91. Moghadam, 175 F.3d at 1280 n.12. 
 92. Id. at 1280. 
 93. See id. at 1281 (leaving undecided the question of whether the “Limited Times” 
requirement would render section 513 of the URAA unconstitutional).  In United States v. 
Martignon, the U.S. District Court of the Southern District of New York held that section 513 is 
an unconstitutional application of the copyright power, both because it violates the “Limited 
Times” requirement and because it violates a “fixation” requirement.  346 F. Supp. 2d 413, 424 
(S.D.N.Y. 2004).  That court recognized that a holding that this section of the URAA is 
unconstitutional need not be in conflict with the Moghadam court’s ruling, if the challenged 
feature of a copyright statute is “fundamentally inconsistent” with the “limitations imposed by 
the Copyright Clause.”  Id. at 428. 
 94. See, e.g., Jaszi, supra note 72; Caroline T. Nguyen, Expansive Copyright Protection for 
All Time? Avoiding Article I Horizontal Limitations Through the Treaty Power, 106 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1079 (2006). 
 95. 100 U.S. 82, 99 (1879). 
 96. 252 U.S. 416 (1920). 
 97. Id. at 432, 433. 
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but rather a statute implemented like any other.98  The commentators 
who propose using the Treaty Power to bypass the Patent and 
Copyright Clause’s limitations generally also recognize that “the 
Treaty Power may . . . not be used to violate affirmative 
prohibitions.”99  Just as under authority of the Commerce Clause, the 
Treaty Power is limited by certain absolute prohibitions on 
congressional power.100  Thus, even among those commentators most 
inclined to view congressional authority broadly, there is general 
agreement that a true prohibition found in one part of the 
Constitution applies to any congressional action.  The next section 
describes two such limitations. 
III.  THE URAA IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL  
UNDER THE PATENT AND COPYRIGHT CLAUSE 
A. Congress may not Grant Copyright to Entities Other than 
“Authors” 
In addition to the more commonly discussed limitations of the 
Patent and Copyright Clause,101 the Clause also contains a specific 
limitation that Congress may secure copyrights only in “Authors.”  
The Supreme Court has defined an “author” as “he to whom anything 
owes its orign [sic].”102  As the Court recently explained, “The Framers 
guarded against the future accumulation of monopoly power in 
booksellers and publishers by authorizing Congress to vest copyrights 
 
 98. See Merschman, supra note 33, at 688 n.146; Nimmer, supra note 12, at 1397–98. 
 99. Nguyen, supra note 94, at 1079. 
 100. Joseph C. Merschman has previously detailed why Congress may not bypass the Patent 
and Copyright Clause by invoking either the Commerce Clause or Trade Power authority.   
Merschman, supra note 33, at 683–92. See also William Patry, The Enumerated Powers Doctrine 
and Intellectual Property: An Imminent Constitutional Collision, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 359, 
361 (1999) (“When a specific clause of the Constitution, such as Clause 8 of Article I, Section 8, 
has been construed as containing general limitations on Congress’s power, Congress may not 
avoid those limitations by legislating under another clause.”); Malla Pollack, The Right to 
Know?: Delimiting Database Protection at the Juncture of the Commerce Clause, the Intellectual 
Property Clause, and the First Amendment, 17 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 47, 60 (1999) 
(“Congress may not do an end run around a limitation in one clause of the Constitution by 
invoking a more general clause . . . .”).  After conducting a review of many of the reasons 
previously advanced for why the Supreme Court should not allow Congress to bypass the Patent 
and Copyright Clause’s limitations, Richard Graves concludes that the ideological makeup of 
the current Court is unlikely to permit such a bypass.  See generally Graves III, supra note 6. 
 101. See supra notes 65–71 and accompanying text. 
 102. Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 58 (1884) (citation omitted). 
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only in ‘Authors.’”103  Nonetheless, section 514 allows entities that hold 
foreign copyrights to obtain a U.S. copyright regardless of whether or 
not they are actually authors.  A recent case in the Fifth Circuit Court 
of Appeals, Alameda Films SA de CV v. Authors Rights Restoration 
Corp., illustrates the application of the URAA in practice.104 
In Alameda Films, twenty-four Mexican film production 
companies brought suit against companies that were distributing 
various Mexican films in the United States that were originally 
produced between the late-1930s and the mid-1950s.105  The Mexican 
film companies argued that, though these works had previously fallen 
into the public domain in the United States, the URAA granted them 
copyrights in the work.  They also argued that copyright “‘vests 
initially in the author or initial rightholder of the work as determined 
by the law of the source country of the work.’”106  As the Fifth Circuit 
explained, “[T]he Plaintiffs can claim restored copyrights in their films 
under the URAA only if the Plaintiffs are considered ‘authors’ under 
Mexican copyright law—the law of the source country of the work.”107  
The question of whether the Mexican film companies could be 
granted copyrights in their work under the URAA then depended not 
on whether they qualified as “Authors,” as envisioned by the 
Constitution, but rather on whether they qualified as “authors,” under 
Mexican law.108  Clearly, the question of what is required to be an 
author in any sovereign nation need have no relationship to the 
standard of “Author” required by the U.S. Constitution.  Therefore, 
whenever a foreign entity which would not meet the Constitution’s 
standard attempts to secure copyright under the URAA, a challenge 
to the constitutionality of section 514 should be brought and should 
be successful. 
 
 103. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 201 n.5 (2003). Because of this limitation, some 
commentators have argued that the work-for-hire doctrine of copyright is unconstitutional.  
E.g., Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The Creative Employee and the Copyright Act of 1976, 54 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 590, 600 (1987).  Others, however, disagree with this conclusion.  E.g., Heald & 
Sherry, supra note 3, at 1190–91. 
 104. 331 F.3d 472 (5th Cir. 2003). 
 105. Id. at 475. 
 106. Id. at 476 n.5 (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 104A(2)(b) (2007)). 
 107. Alameda Films, 331 F.3d at 477. 
 108. See id. at 477–78. 
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B. Congress may not Remove Works from the Public Domain 
1. The Graham Rule—Congress May Not Grant Patents To 
Works In The Public Domain—One additional, specific limitation 
that the Supreme Court has recognized is that Congress may not 
remove work from the public domain.109  In Graham v. John Deere 
Co., the Supreme Court explicitly pronounced that “Congress may 
not authorize the issuance of patents whose effects are to remove 
existent knowledge from the public domain, or to restrict free access 
to materials already available.”110  While this statement is often 
derided as “a dictum,”111 lower courts are “bound by Supreme Court 
dicta almost as firmly as by the Court’s outright holdings.”112  
Furthermore, the conclusion that Congress may not remove works 
from the public domain was built upon a substantial foundation of 
cases, which held that individual authors and the states are similarly 
precluded, and has been reaffirmed. 
In Pfaff v. Wells Electronics, Inc., Justice Stevens, writing for a 
unanimous Court, explained that the Court’s previous holdings, which 
prohibited an inventor from removing works from the public domain, 
were based on the Constitution.113  After discussing patent’s role, “as 
contemplated by the Constitution,”114 he noted that “the Patent Act 
serves as a limiting provision, . . . excluding ideas that are in the public 
domain from patent protection.”115  He further explained, “The patent 
laws . . . seek . . . to protect the public’s right to retain knowledge 
 
 109. By “public domain” I am referring to a concept akin to a definition offered by Yochai 
Benkler: “The public domain is the range of uses of information that any person is privileged to 
make absent individualized facts that make a particular use by a particular person 
unprivileged.”   Yochai Benkler, Free as the Air to Common Use: First Amendment Constraints 
on Enclosure of the Public Domain, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 354, 362 (1999).  Heald & Sherry 
describe this limitation as the “public domain principle.”  Heald & Sherry, supra note 3, at 
1165–66. 
 110. 383 U.S. 1, 6 (1966). 
 111. E.g., Luck’s Music Library, Inc. v. Gonzales, 407 F.3d 1262, 1266 (D.C. Cir. 2005). 
 112. United States v. Nelson, 383 F.3d 1227, 1232 (10th Cir. 2004) (citation omitted). 
 113. 525 U.S. 55, 64–65 (1998).  Justice Stevens specifically discussed only the holding in 
Pennock v. Dialogue, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 1 (1829), but his analysis applies equally to additional 
patent cases including, for example, Kendall v. Winsor, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 322, 328 (1858) 
(“Moreover, that which is once given to or is invested in the public, cannot be recalled nor taken 
from them.”), and Shaw v. Cooper, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 292, 323 (1833) (“Whatever may be the 
intention of the inventor, if he suffers his invention to go into public use, through any means 
whatsoever, without an immediate assertion of his right, he is not entitled to a patent.”). 
 114. Pfaff, 525 U.S. at 64 (quoting Seymour v. Osborne, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 516, 533–34 
(1870)). 
 115. Id. 
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already in the public domain.”116  The Federal Circuit has further 
recognized that one of the purposes of patent’s public-use bar to 
patentability is “discouraging the removal, from the public domain, of 
inventions that the public reasonably has come to believe are freely 
available.”117  Thus, undoubtedly the Constitution prohibits individuals 
from removing works from the public domain through patents. 
The Supreme Court has made clear that the states are similarly 
prohibited from removing work from the public domain, and the 
Court has affirmed that this limitation derives from the Patent and 
Copyright Clause.  In Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., the 
Court noted that “[t]o forbid copying would interfere with the federal 
policy, found in Art. I, § 8, cl. 8, of the Constitution . . . of allowing free 
access to copy whatever the federal patent and copyright laws leave in 
the public domain.”118  The Court based this assertion on its holding in 
Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., which recognized only that states 
may not enact measures inconsistent with federal patent laws.119  Thus, 
one interpretation is that the Clause is intended only to describe a 
limitation, rooted in the Supremacy Clause, that the states cannot 
grant patents and copyrights beyond those established by Congress.120  
This explanation would mean that the Court’s recognition that the 
“policy of the patent law: that which is in the public domain cannot be 
removed therefrom by action of the States”121 must be based 
exclusively on the Supremacy Clause. 
However, this reading would ignore Compco’s explicit reference 
to the Patent and Copyright Clause as establishing a policy of leaving 
the public domain untouched, as well as the fact that Compco never 
even mentioned the Supremacy Clause.122  Since Compco’s 
admonition that works in the public domain must remain there was 
explicitly based on the Patent and Copyright Clause, it necessarily 
applies to Congressional actions.  In Goldstein v. California, the Court 
explicitly made this very point, noting that “Section 8 enumerates 
 
 116. Id. at 65 (emphasis added). 
 117. Baxter Int’l, Inc. v. Cobe Labs., Inc. 88 F.3d 1054, 1058 (Fed. Cir. 1996). 
 118. 376 U.S. 234, 237 (1964). 
 119. 376 U.S. 225, 232–33 (1964). 
 120. In fact, the Court has clearly stated that Sears itself was rooted in the Supremacy 
Clause.  Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 204 n.8. (2003). 
 121. See Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 481 (1974). 
 122. See Theodore H. Davis Jr., Copying In The Shadow Of The Constitution: The Rational 
Limits Of Trade Dress Protection, 80 MINN. L. REV. 595, 610–13 (1996); Shipley, supra note 21, 
at 59–65. 
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those powers which have been granted to Congress; Whatever 
limitations have been appended to such powers can only be 
understood as a limit on congressional . . . action.”123  In Kewanee Oil 
Co. v. Bicron Corp., the Court referred to “[t]he policy that matter 
once in the public domain must remain in the public domain,”124 and 
in Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., the Court reaffirmed 
this rule.”125  The inevitable conclusion from these cases is that the 
Court meant what it said in Graham, and that the prohibition on 
issuing patents to work in the public domain applies to Congress as 
well as the states.  As the Court put it, “[W]e have consistently 
reiterated the teaching of Sears and Compco that ideas once placed 
before the public without the protection of a valid patent are subject 
to appropriation without significant restraint.”126 
By passing section 514 of the URAA, Congress exceeded the 
boundaries established by Graham, but it has done so in the copyright 
rather than the patent context.  The district court in Golan v. Gonzales 
wrote that “[i]t is unlikely that the public has a greater interest in 
copyrightable works than it does in patentable ones,” thus refusing to 
rely on patent cases and concluding that Congress is not precluded 
from taking copyrighted works from the public domain.127  This notion 
of the public’s alleged “greater interest” in patent is reminiscent of 
judicial notions that elicited Justice Holmes’ famous reminder that 
“[i]t would be a dangerous undertaking for persons trained only to 
the law to constitute themselves final judges of the worth of pictorial 
illustrations, outside of the narrowest and most obvious limits.”128  A 
blanket conclusion that the works protected by patent are more 
important to the public than those of copyright is just as unwarranted 
as a proclamation that a single work is more worthy than another 
within the field of copyright.  Who can say that the next Shakespeare 
or Monet is any less important for society, or worthy of protection, 
than the next patent issued for a computer or better mousetrap?  A 
blanket statement in favor of patents over copyrights seems 
 
 123. 412 U.S. 546, 560 (1973). 
 124. 416 U.S. 470, 484 (1974). 
 125. 489 U.S. 141, 152 (1989) (quoting Singer Mfg. Co. v. June Mfg. Co., 163 U.S. 169, 185 
(1896) (clarifying that when an invention enters the public domain “the right to make the thing 
formerly covered by the patent becomes public property”)). 
 126. Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 156. 
 127. No. Civ.01-B-1854(BNB), 2005 WL 914754, at *5 (D. Colo. Apr. 20, 2005), aff’d in part, 
remanded in part, 501 F.3d 1179 (10th  Cir. 2007). 
 128. Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251 (1903). 
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particularly questionable when one considers design patents, which 
may issue for works that are often also copyrightable,129 and serve 
much the same purpose.130 
Previous courts and commentators have had the opportunity to 
explore the application of the Graham rule to Congress’ authority 
with respect to copyrights.  Paul J. Heald and Suzanna Sherry, in an 
interesting analysis, considered the application of this limitation, as 
well as others implied by the Patent and Copyright Clause, to two 
federal copyright statutes, the Copyright Term Extension Act 
(“CTEA”)131 and the URAA.132  While they suggested that the URAA 
“may be subject to challenge under either the Public Domain 
Principle or the Quid Pro Quo Principle,” they ultimately concluded 
that “only the Quid Pro Quo Principle presents serious problems.”133  
Although recognizing that the URAA “takes some works out of the 
public domain,” Heald and Sherry concluded that this was permissible 
based on their description of this taking as only an “administrative 
technicalit[y].”134  On the other hand, they concluded that application 
of the Quid Pro Quo principle rendered both the CTEA and URAA 
unconstitutional.135 
These ideas were tested by the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals in 
Eldred v. Reno, when that court considered the constitutionality of 
the CTEA.136  Although the D.C. Circuit rejected Heald and Sherry’s 
conclusion that the CTEA is unconstitutional, the court also 
explained, in dicta, that the directive from the Supreme Court’s 
Graham decision dealing with patents would “preclude the Congress 
from authorizing under [the Patent and Copyright] Clause a copyright 
to a work already in the public domain.”137  During oral argument 
 
 129. See Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201 (1954). 
 130. See Gorham Mfg. Co. v. White, 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 511, 524 (1871) (“The acts of 
Congress which authorize the grant of patents for designs were plainly intended to give 
encouragement to the decorative arts.  They contemplate not so much utility as appearance . . . 
.”). 
 131. Heald & Sherry, supra note 3, at 1168–76 (discussing the Copyright Term Extension 
Act, Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112 Stat. 2827 (1998)). 
 132. Id. at 1179–81 (discussing the Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, 
sec. 514, § 104A(h)(6), 108 Stat. 4809, 4980–81 (1994)). 
 133. Id. at 1180.  This latter assertion was rejected in Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 217 
(2003). 
 134. Heald & Sherry, supra note 3, at 1180. 
 135. Id. at 1169, 1180. 
 136. Eldred v. Reno, 239 F.3d 372 (D.C. Cir. 2001), aff’d sub nom. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 
U.S. 186 (2003). 
 137. Id. at 377. 
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before the Supreme Court, the government conceded as much, noting 
that there is a “bright line” between those works with existing 
copyrights, which were extended by the CTEA, and other works 
already in the public domain.138  When the Supreme Court considered 
Eldred, Justice Stevens, in his dissent, disregarded any argument that 
works could be removed from the public domain, noting that “no one 
seriously contends that the Copyright/Patent Clause would authorize 
the grant of monopoly privileges for works already in the public 
domain.”139  Still, Eldred did not depend upon a determination of this 
issue, and when the D.C. Circuit later directly faced this question, it 
concluded that the URAA’s granting of copyrights to works already 
in the public domain does not violate the Patent and Copyright 
Clause.140  Relying on Eldred, that court took the fact that Congress 
could extend existing copyrights to mean that Congress would be able 
to do the opposite and remove work already within the public 
domain.141 
When the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals examined the application 
of the URAA, that court similarly refused to rely on the patent cases, 
noting that “[p]atents . . . are not copyrights, and thus patent cases are 
inapposite to copyright cases.”142  However, a review of the history of 
the Supreme Court’s overlapping treatment of patents and copyrights 
clearly illustrates that it is unreasonable for lower courts to conclude 
that the limitation on removing works from the public domain is 
“inapposite” to copyright. 
2. The Graham Rule Applies Equally to Copyrights—The 
constitutional copyright provision is found in the same clause as the 
constitutional patent provision: “The Congress shall have Power . . . 
To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for 
limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their 
respective Writings and Discoveries.”143  Since the very first case 
interpreting the Patent and Copyright Clause, the Supreme Court has 
relied on a presumption of parallelism between the “Discoveries” of 
 
 138. Transcript of Oral Argument at 44, Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (October 9, 2002) 
(No. 01-618). 
 139. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. at 240 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 140. See Luck’s Music Library, Inc. v. Gonzales, 407 F.3d 1262, 1263 (D.C. Cir. 2005). 
 141. Id. at 1263–65. 
 142. Alameda Films SA de CV v. Authors Rights Restoration Corp. Inc., 331 F.3d 472, 483 
n.33 (5th Cir. 2003). 
 143. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
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“Inventors” and the “Writings” of “Authors.”144  In Wheaton v. Peters, 
the Court faced the question of the correct interpretation of the word 
“securing” within the Patent and Copyright Clause.145  Although the 
case only pertained to copyrights, the Court reasoned that the word’s 
placement within the clause dictated that it “refers to inventors, as 
well as authors.”146  The Court then interpreted the word in light of its 
dual application to both copyrights and patents.147  In subsequent 
interpretations of the Patent and Copyright Clause, the Court has 
maintained the general rule that patents and copyrights are to be 
treated the same.  For example, in Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, the Court 
explicitly stated, “[W]hat we have said as to the purposes of the 
government in relation to copyrights applies as well, mutatis 
mutandis, to patents which are granted under the same constitutional 
authority to promote the progress of science and useful arts.”148  
Reflecting on over 100 years of precedent in interpreting the Clause, 
Justice Douglas once pointed out that “[n]o distinction is made in the 
constitutional language between copyrights and patents and I would 
not create one by judicial gloss.”149 
This is not to say that there are no differences between patents 
and copyrights.  Even when analogizing between them, the Court has 
remained mindful that “[t]he two areas of the law, naturally, are not 
identical twins, and we exercise the caution which we have expressed 
in the past in applying doctrine formulated in one area to the 
other.”150  As evidence of that caution, the Court has pointed to its 
 
 144. This parallel structure apparently does not extend to the terms “Science” and “useful 
Arts” in the preamble to the Patent and Copyright Clause, as these terms apply to both patent 
and copyright.  Compare Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 961 
(2005) (“The Constitution itself stresses the vital role that copyright plays in advancing the 
‘useful Arts.’”) (Breyer, J., concurring) with the title of the first Patent Act, “An Act to promote 
the progress of useful Arts.”  Act of April 10, 1790, 1 Stat. 109. 
 145. 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591 (1834). 
 146. Id. at 592. 
 147. Id. 
 148. 286 U.S. 123, 131 (1932). See also Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 
234, 237 (1964) (“Today we have held in Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co. that when an article 
is unprotected by a patent or a copyright, state law may not forbid others to copy that article.”) 
(citation omitted); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 228, 231 n.7 (1964); 
Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 578 n.3 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (recognizing that, 
in previous cases, “the Court repeatedly referred to the patent and copyright statues as if the 
same rules of interpretation applied to both”). 
 149. Lee v. Runge, 404 U.S. 887, 890 (1971) (Douglas, J., dissenting from denial of 
certiorari). 
 150. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 439 n.19 (1984). 
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early decisions in Mazer v. Stein and Bobbs-Merrill v. Straus.151  In the 
seminal Stein case, the Court refused to apply patent’s “exclusive right 
to the art” to copyright.152  As it explained, “The copyright protects 
originality rather than novelty or invention.”153 Similarly, in Bobbs-
Merrill, without pointing to any particular difference, the Court noted 
only “that there are differences between the patent and copyright 
statutes in the extent of the protection granted by them.”154  In Eldred 
v. Ashcroft, the Court again exercised this caution, finding that “one 
cannot extract from language in our patent decisions . . . genuine 
support for petitioners’ bold view . . . that a quid pro quo requirement 
stops Congress from expanding copyright’s term in a manner that 
puts existing and future copyrights in parity.”155 
Importantly, the fact that the Court has described differences 
between patents and copyrights does not detract from the general 
rule that doctrines based in the Constitution apply equally to both.  
Instead, the differences between patent and copyright suggest only 
that they be treated differently, when necessary, to reflect inherent 
differences about what constitutes a patent or a copyright.  Where the 
Court has found constitutional differences between patent and 
copyright, these differences are due only to the difference between 
the terms “author,” “writings,” “inventor,” and “discoveries.”156  Thus, 
the Court’s definitions of an “author” as “he to whom anything owes 
its orign [sic]; originator; maker; one who completes a work of science 
or literature,”157 and of “writings” as “the literary productions of those 
authors, . . . to include all forms . . . by which the ideas in the mind of 
the author are given visible expression,”158 dictate the originality 
requirement of copyright.159  Judge Learned Hand summarized 
 
 151. Id. 
 152. Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 217 (1954). 
 153. Id. at 218. 
 154. Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Strauss, 210 U.S. 339, 345 (1908). 
 155. 537 U.S. 186, 217 (2003). 
 156. Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 250 (1903) (citing with 
approval a district court’s observation, in Henderson v. Tompkins, 60 F. 758, 764 (C.C.D. Mass. 
1894), that “[t]here is a very broad distinction between what is implied in the word ‘author,’ 
found in the constitution, and the word ‘inventor.’”). 
 157. Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 58 (1884). 
 158. Id. See also Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 94 (1879) (“[T]he word writings . . . 
include[s] . . . only such as are original, and are founded in the creative powers of the mind. . . . 
the fruits of intellectual labor.”). 
 159. Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., Inc, 499 U.S. 340, 346 (1991) (“Originality is a 
constitutional requirement. . . . [T]he crucial terms ‘authors’ and ‘writings’ . . . presuppose a 
degree of originality.”). 
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copyright’s originality requirement when he famously declared that 
“if by some magic a man who had never known it were to compose 
anew Keats’s Ode on a Grecian Urn, he would be an ‘author,’ and, if 
he copyrighted it, others might not copy that poem, though they might 
of course copy Keats’s.”160  Similarly, the Court’s understanding of the 
meaning of “Inventor” and “Discovery” dictate the novelty 
requirement of patents.161  The reduced originality versus novelty 
standard162 explains why patents inherently create a monopoly on 
ideas,163 whereas copyright grants a more limited right only to prevent 
direct copying.164 
Similarly, the inherent difference between the writings of authors 
and discoveries of inventors explains why it is “much more important 
that when the supposed author sues for a violation of his copyright, 
the existence of those facts of originality, of intellectual production, of 
thought, and conception of the part of the author should be proved 
than in the case of a patent right.”165  Likewise, these inherent 
differences explain why “patent’s quid pro quo is more exacting than 
copyright’s.”166  As the Court explained in Eldred, “For the author 
seeking copyright protection . . . disclosure is the desired objective, not 
something exacted from the author in exchange for the copyright.”167  
This consideration is inherent in an author’s writing and is not 
dictated by differential application of the Patent and Copyright 
Clause’s limitations to the two types of works.  In fact, the Court has 
given no guidance to suggest that any word or phrase of the Patent 
and Copyright Clause should have a different meaning depending 
upon whether it is applied to patents or copyrights.  In Justice 
 
 160. Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d 49, 54 (2d Cir. 1936). 
 161. See Pfaff v. Wells Elecs., Inc. 525 U.S. 55, 60 (1998) (“The primary meaning of the word 
‘invention’ in the Patent Act unquestionably refers to the inventor’s conception rather than to a 
physical embodiment of that idea.”). See also Alexander Milburn Co. v. Davis Bournonville Co. 
270 U.S. 390, 400 (1926) (“[O]ne really must be the first inventor in order to be entitled to a 
patent.”). 
 162. Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 218 (1954) (recognizing that unlike a patent “[t]he 
copyright protects originality rather than novelty or invention”). 
 163. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 217 n.22 (2003) (recognizing that patent grants 
prevent full use of an inventor’s knowledge whereas a copyright “gives the holder no monopoly 
on any knowledge”). 
 164. Sheldon, 81 F.2d at 54. 
 165. Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 59–60 (1884). 
 166. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 217 n.22. 
 167. Id. at 216. 
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Douglas’ words, the Court has not distinguished between patents and 
copyrights “by judicial gloss.”168 
Indeed, the Court has repeatedly—including in a series of recent 
cases—referred to holdings pertaining only to patents or to copyrights 
to inform its inquiry regarding the other.  In Sony Corp. of America v. 
Universal City Studios, Inc., the Court applied the patent doctrine of 
contributory infringement to copyright.169  Then, in Metro-Goldwyn-
Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., the Court decided that “[f]or the 
same reasons that Sony took the staple-article doctrine of patent law 
as a model for its copyright safe-harbor rule, the inducement rule, too, 
is a sensible one for copyright.”170  Most recently, in eBay Inc. v. 
MercExchange, L.L.C., the Court adopted copyright doctrine and 
applied it to patents, this time with respect to when an injunction 
should be granted in an infringement case.171  In fact, in Eldred v. 
Ashcroft, the very case relied upon by those courts which refused to 
apply patent doctrine to copyright when they considered the URAA, 
the Court noted, “Because the Clause empowering Congress to confer 
copyrights also authorizes patents, congressional practice with respect 
to patents informs our inquiry.”172  The lower courts have similarly 
applied doctrines from patent law to copyright.173 
Specifically with respect to the removal of works from the public 
domain, the parallelism between patent and copyright has already 
been applied to the powers of authors and the states.  It is clear that 
authors, like inventors, cannot remove work from the public 
domain.174  Similarly, the limitation preventing the states from granting 
patents to works in the public domain is equally applicable to 
copyright, as evidenced by the Court’s reference to both in the 
 
 168. Lee v. Runge, 404 U.S. 887, 890 (1971) (Douglas, J., dissenting from denial of 
certiorari). 
 169. 464 U.S. 417, 439 (1984) (“The closest analogy is provided by the patent law cases to 
which it is appropriate to refer because of the historic kinship between patent law and copyright 
law.”). 
 170. 545 U.S. 913, 936 (2005). 
 171. 126 S. Ct. 1837, 1840 (2006). 
 172. 537 U.S. 186, 201 (2003). 
 173. E.g., Lasercomb Am., Inc. v. Reynolds, 911 F.2d 970, 973 (4th Cir. 1990) (“We are 
persuaded, however, that a misuse of copyright defense is inherent in the law of copyright just as 
a misuse of patent defense is inherent in patent law.”). 
 174. Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 33–34 (2003) (“[O]nce 
the patent or copyright monopoly has expired, the public may use the invention or work at will 
and without attribution.”); Steward v Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 223 (1990) (noting that a work can 
be infringed only “[s]o long as the pre-existing work remains out of the public domain”); Singer 
Mfg. Co. v. June Mfg. Co., 163 U.S. 169 (1896). 
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Compco decision.175  That Congress would similarly be precluded is 
reasonable in light of the parallel structure in the Patent and 
Copyright Clause and the Court’s continued application of each word 
in the Clause to both forms of intellectual property in like manner.  In 
contrast to the suggestion that copyright in public domain work 
should be available where patents clearly are not, a former member of 
the Court suggested that if there are differences between patents and 
copyright, “a copyright may have to meet greater constitutional 
standards for validity than a patent.”176 
Finally, it is important to note that, in addition to the application 
of the patent cases to copyright, including Graham’s proclamation, the 
Supreme Court had already concluded that Congress may not use the 
Patent and Copyright Clause to remove works from the public 
domain nearly a century before Graham.177  When the Court first 
considered the constitutionality of trademarks in the Trade-Mark 
Cases, it had the opportunity to consider the application of the Patent 
and Copyright Clause to that form of intellectual property.178 While 
the case is primarily remembered for the notion that Congress could 
not grant trademark protection under the Patent and Copyright 
Clause,179 often overlooked is that the Court’s conclusion that 
trademarks could not be justified under the Patent and Copyright 
Clause also relied on the fact that trademarks were “the adoption of 
something already in existence.”180  Importantly, unlike in Graham, 
this is a direct reference both to copyright as well as to patent.181  As 
the Court did not distinguish between the two in terms of what they 
require in this regard, the holding necessarily represents a limitation 
of both the Patent and the Copyright Clauses; a limitation that has 
neither been contravened nor overruled. 
 
 175. Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. 376 U.S. 234, 237 (1964). 
 176. Lee v. Runge, 404 U.S. 887, 890 (1971) (Douglas, J., dissenting from denial of 
certiorari). 
 177. See Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 94 (1879). 
 178. Id. 
 179. Heald & Sherry, supra note 3, at 1156 (“Congress had no power under the Intellectual 
Property Clause to protect trademarks, because they are not ‘a sudden invention’ and require 
‘no fancy or imagination, no genius, no laborious thought.’”) (quoting Trade-Mark Cases, 100 
U.S. at 94). 
 180. Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. at 94. 
 181. The Court explained, for example, “[i]f we should endeavor to classify it under the 
head of writings of authors, the objections are equally strong.  In this, as in regard to inventions, 
originality is required.”  Id. at 94. The Court concluded that “we are unable to see any such 
power in the constitutional provision concerning authors and inventors, and their writings and 
discoveries.”  Id. at 95. 
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CONCLUSION 
Section 514 of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act182 is an 
unconstitutional application of the copyright power granted to 
Congress.  In the name of international trade, Congress has granted 
foreign entities American copyrights, circumventing the Constitution’s 
mandate that copyrights be granted solely to “Authors.”  Courts asked 
to review this statute should also pay close attention to the Supreme 
Court’s long history of analogous treatment of patents and copyrights.  
Absent contrary indication from the Supreme Court, courts should 
apply the general rule that doctrine grounded in either of the two 
halves of the Patent and Copyright Clause applies equally to the 
other half.  With respect to the URAA, this doctrine mandates that 
Congress may not remove works from the public domain, as they 
have done under section 514. 
Today, the promotion of international trade has become a 
dominant force in domestic policy debates, and the URAA is just one 
development, albeit an important one, in this movement.183  The policy 
considerations being discussed during passage of the U.S. 
Constitution, were very different, however, even opposite.184  Just a 
few years ago, Professor Graeme Austin asked whether the Patent 
and Copyright Clause mandated isolationism.185  In Eldred v. Ashcroft, 
the Court answered the question, in part and in the negative, by 
deferring to the international concerns prompting Congress to enact 
the CTEA.186  However, this should not be taken as granting Congress 
a blank check to rely on international trade concerns without limit.  
Congress’ ability to bring the United States into line with 
international norms is nonetheless constrained by a Constitution, 
which does in fact mandate some degree of isolationism.  As Professor 
Austin recognized, while international law issues were not necessarily 
raised under the CTEA, some international questions are inherent in 
 
 182. Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, sec. 514, § 104A, 108 Stat. 4809, 
4976–81 (1994) (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 104A). 
 183. See, e.g., Trade Agreements Work for America, Office of the United States Trade 
Representative, available at http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Document_Library/Fact_Sheets/2006/ 
asset_upload_file920_9647.pdf. 
 184. See generally THE FEDERALIST NO. 43 (James Madison). 
 185. Graeme W. Austin, Does the Copyright Clause Mandate Isolationism? 26 COLUM. J.L. 
& ARTS 17, 59 (2002) (cautioning against “an isolationist reading of the Copyright Clause that is 
in tension with . . . America’s international copyright relations over the last hundred or so 
years”). 
 186. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 205–06 (2003). 
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the URAA.187  It does not conflict with Professor Austin’s broad 
conclusion that “emerging international intellectual property norms 
might be allowed at least to influence thinking about doctrinal 
positions as well as fundamental principles in U.S. copyright 
jurisprudence,”188 to recognize that in some respects, the Constitution 
is unyielding.  As the Court has described, the Constitution “sets forth, 
and rests upon, innovative principles original to the American 
experience.”189  Though some of the Constitution’s limitations may 
appear to be outdated today, they must nonetheless be respected.  The 
challenge for Congress today is to find a way to meet our 
international obligations without trading American “air.” 
 
 187. Austin, supra note 185, at 20. 
 188. Id. at 58–59. 
 189. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005). 
